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THE PATH OF PEACE-KEEPING 
Let me hegin by telling you how happy I am to he in Portugal again_ 
My Iast visil was in 1969, when I came to see some elose friends and we 
had a wonderful time. 
NorrnalIy, I have the impression that may work follows me everywhere. 
Long after I have left my offiee, it stares at me out of a newspaper. lt 
flashes hefore my eyes on a television screen. ln the last two days, howe-
ver, my eyes have beea filled with the beauty of your country. I have seen 
the Palace of the Marquis of Fronteira, I have visited the Museum of Ancient 
Art, and ! have experienced the Jeronimos Monastery. These visits have 
restored in me a sence of beauty and balance, a sense of energy and inspira-
tion, a sense of perspective. 
With that rcnewed perspective, that energy and balance, I want to 
examine peace-keeping with you. At the moment, three very fundamental 
questions sU\1'ound it: «What are wc doing?»; «When should we become 
involved'?»; and «When must we end our involvement?». 
BACKGROUND 
So that we may examine the first of these, let me begin by quantifying 
briefly some of the changes which peace-keeping has experienced. 
For over 40 of peace-keeping's 46 years, the mandates of DPKO's 
missions were defined very clearly. Peace-keeping, through most of the UN's 
history, meant: 
«the use of multinational military personnel, armed 01' unarmed, under 
international command and with the consent of the parties, to help control 
and resolve confliet between hostile states and between hostile communities 
within a state». 
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ln the last five years, however, hardly a single one of these parameters 
has been left untouched. The need for consent of the parties was overridden 
by humanitarian imperatives. Volatile situations in the field mad it neces-
sary to expand the definitions of both self-defence and the justified use of 
force. Even the range and nature of international command has become 
hotly debated. Mandates have far exceeded the traditional supervision of 
truces and separation of antagonists; they now comprise duties as diverse 
as monitoring free and fair elections, guaranteeing the delivery of humani-
tarian aid in war zones, overseeing land reform and human rigths, reinte~ 
grating armed combatants into productive civilian roles, intervening in situa-
tions of eivil war, establishing safe and secure environments, and remaining 
in towns and villages under a!tack to prevent loss of life. 
With expansion of duties has come growth in demando Only two 
operations were created in peace-keeping's first five years; 17 have been 
mounted in the last five. To respond to this proliferation, the number of 
UN peace-keepers deployed has increased from 11500 in 1992 to 73200 
today. ln monetary terms, the costs of sustaining these missions has risen 
from $626 million in 1986 to $1.2 billion in 1992. and it is expected to 
reach $3.8 billion this yeal'. 
These figures, however, leave out some of lhe most significant parts 
of the story: the shortfalls in authorized troop leveIs, the sometimes sudden 
withdrawal of contingents before the expiry of their mandates, the large 
arrearages in payment of assessed peace-keeping contributions, and, most im-
portant, the uncertain global politicaI will to pursue and persist in lhe 
challenges before us. 
What sort of future do these challenges foretell? 
1 believe that peace-keeping today is at a crossroads. Some nations 
have decided to restrict their participation i11 peace-keeping to «areas of 
vital national interest». And when such interests are identified, they are 
increasingly being pursued unilaterally, with 01' without the approval of 
the Security Counei!. It is becoming ever more difficult to obtain additional 
well-trained and·equipped troops for peace-keeping missions. 
The situation on the ground augurs no bettel'. Peace-keepers have been 
kidnapped, killed, and dragged through the streets. Even NGO's are finding 
their offices sacked and burned. ln Somalia, peace enforcement nearly made 
us a party to the conflic!. ln eroa!ia, eivi\ians have blocked convoys carrying 
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humanitarian aid. ln many areas, our presence has been used not to end 
conflict, but mereIy to proIol1g it to advantage. We have been asked more 
than once to keep peace where there is no peace to keep. 
ln spite of ali of this, wc have been able to secure a number of impor-
tant successes together: Cambodia, EI Salvador, the Aouzou Strip. UNTAG, 
the United Nations mission in Namibia, to which Portugal sent electoral 
observers, is counted one Df QUI" greatest successes. ONUMUZ, Qur mission 
in Mozambique, to which yOlI have contributed a signal company, military 
observers, and civilian police, migth soon be al1other. That slIeeess, I mlIst 
stress, is stiU far from certain, hut our progress in Mozambique has given 
us hopc. 
Even in mlSS10ns where success has 50 far eluded us, we have made 
(and sometimes left) the sitlIation rar better than we found it. 
Bosnia now has areas of peace, and Somalia is no longer starving. But 
this is not enough. The huge problems of the Iast months demand not only 
that we re-examine what we are doing; they insist that we look at how we 
are doing it. One situation exposes them better than any other: Rwanda. 
RWANDA 
Rwanda, more than any olheI' operation, wiU be remembered for demons-
trating what a lack of wiIl can do_ The costs to be bome in the years ahead 
wUl remind lIS aU too often that inaction is also a form of action, indeeision 
a kind of decision - which, in some situations, could have powerful, even 
tragic, consequences. 
Within weeks of lhe assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and 
Burundi 011 6 April, hundreds of thousands were dead. We were aware of 
this; media coverage of the crisis was both instant and constan!. Yet, on 
21 April, fol1owing the Belgian Govemment"s decision to withdraw its 
contingent (which was the best equipped of al1) and the Bangladeshi eontin-
gel1t"s decision that it wouId be able only to proteet itself, the Seeurity 
Counei! reaetOO by redueing UNAMIR from the 2000 ali ranks previously 
mandated to a mere 444. As the magnitude of the tragedy expanded, our 
response eontraeted. The Seeretary-General persisted, however, urging that 
UNAMIR be strengthened to 5500. But this was authorized only on 17 May, 
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nearly six weeks after the onset of the crisis, and afler an estimated 
500 000 had already died. 
On 12 May, five days before the expansion af the mission to 5500 
was confirmed, DPKO had already approached 30 govemments with requests 
for troops and equipment. ln the day following the mission's expansion, 
!wo further calls were made by the Secul'ity Council to member states to 
respond to that appeal. They were further followed by a range of informal 
contacts on our parto The silence that followed was deafening. Ten weeks 
later, at the end of July, a mere 550 soldiers were on the ground. By that 
point, the greatest part of the damage had been done. 
Many countries were in a position to help avoid this. lnterestingly, 
the majority of those who did help were those least in a position to do soo 
However, among the 5 permanent members of the Security Cauncil, ali of 
whom voted for the resolution and any of whom could have supplied 
swift and substantial support for this mission, the eurtiest response came 
more than a month after the appeals I just mentioned. More significantly, 
the fjrst !WO members of the P·5 to respond did not contribute forces to 
UNAMIR, but took unilateral action instead. 
I do not wish to betittle the good those unilateral missions did. The 
French created the Humanitarian Protection Zone, which safeguarded the 
tives of countless people. The Americans joined in the delivery of humani-
tarian aid at a moment when it was still desperately needed. I do, however, 
wish to strike a note of concern regarding the precedent they have set and 
the message they have given. Both of the P-5 members who acted unilaterally 
and late voted for resolutions which called for action multilaterally and 
early. What does this difference between word and deed signify? 
ISSUES 
Does it indicate a lack of faith in the multinational command and con-
traI which is an essential component of peace-keeping? Does it imply 
misgivings regarding peace-keeping's traditional rules of engagement? 01' does 
it insinuate a fear of being bogged down in along term mission even after 
domestic interest in it has dwindled? We should explore these possibilities. 
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The interesting aspect of the command and contrai debate is that it is 
far from universaL The large majority of the UN's member states who 
participate in these operations accept as a given that an intemational mission 
should have international command and controL Their contingents do not 
take orders from their capitaIs, confer with Iheir capitais before accepting 
orders from us, ar withdraw prematurely. 
The command and control obstade, ironically, has proven most insur-
mountable for those whom it should worry least. Their pIace in the Security 
Council and the proportion that they could assume in any operation wouId 
guarantee them more than adequale representation. What their resistance 
says, in essence, is that they wi1\ not act multilaterally. At best, they will 
act unilaterally in a multilateral context. 
This is unforlunate. Further, it is arguably unviable, both in practice and 
in principIe. If we look carefully at lhe lessons of Somalia, we wiII not see 
that internationaI command and contraI can't work; we wiII see that it 
must. We will reeI instinctively lhe danger created for those in lhe fieId 
when conflicting instructions are given and orders are either referred or 
rcjected. Looking again at Somalia, wc hear today that it has taught us 
how Iow our tolerance to fata\ities is. If this is true, as [ believe it to be, 
lhen it makes resistance to unified conunand and contraI on the part of 
concerned governments ali the more incomprehensible. For nOlhing can 
lower this risk like working together, and nothing can increase it like the 
failure to do soo 
The urgency of unified command and control is most evident where 
contingents or entire missions must be withdrawn under hostile circums-
tances. Today, lwo of our missions face this prospect: UNOSOM II and 
UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR is preparing for a worst case scenario in which 
elose co-ordination with and support fram NATO's AFSOUTH will be 
essentiaL UNOSOM II is faced with a different threat, but one which couId 
prove equally fatal: a rapid withdrawal under hostile circumstances in 
whlch no assured sea or air support has S~ far been provided by any member 
state. Any of you who have seen the port and aiirpo!'t facilities in Mogadishu 
can understand the difficuIties and dangers which such a withdrawaI would 
entai!. 
ln both these instances, should they occur, unified command and contraI 
wi1\ prove the vital factor. Nations might be tempted to take unilateral 
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action to protect 01' extricate their troops, but such aclion would mOre likely 
deepen tbe problem than resolve iI. ln these delicate situations, a break-
down in command and control could welI prove catastrophic. 
Beyond command and contrai, however, lies another possible concern: 
tbe Rules of Engagement which have traditiona1Iy accompanied tbe UN's 
peace-keeping operarions. Member states have complained that these are 
too confining. National arroies, we are reminded, are not limited to firing 
merely in self defence. Their convoys would not necessarily tum back if 
blockaded. This fundamental difference between peace-keeping and national 
action has its pros and COns. 
One of tbe more painful lessons tbat we have learned during the last 
two years is how fine a line there is between being part of the solution 
and part of the problem. We must remain careful not to eross it and mind-
fui of tbe price ar doing soo Within tbat restriction, however, there is a great 
deal tbat we can do to expand our range of action and influence. 
ln my mind, our rules of engagement matler far less to those on the 
ground tban the strength we have to enforce them. Rules of engagement 
must be applied with common sense. Force too easily reverted to by peace-
-keepers who are quickly outnumbered will prove only counterproductive. 
The invasion recent1y planned for Haiti was to have involved 20000. lt 
would have outweighed tbe local Haitian forces by 3: I. We can therefore 
assume that its ability to complete its given tasks would be rather high. ln 
Rwanda, on tbe other hand, the RGF and RPF forces combined totalIed 
over 50000. At its maximum, UNAMIR would comprise 5500, just over 
10% of the local Rwandan forces. And we should remember that, at the 
heigth of the crisis, UNAM IR was reduced to lesse than 500, ar less than 
1 % of tbe strengtb af the local forces. ln a state of chaos, whatever our 
rules of engagement, what kind of impact can a force of this proportion 
hope to have? 
There is, however, anot11er side to this point. A larger force means 
not only that it is more likely that we can act forcefulIy. lt also means 
that it is less likely that we will have to do soo The factor of deterrence should 
not be underestimated. Civilians will block a smalI convoy whose untrained 
members have not yet mastered the machines they have just been given. 
The sarne civilians face different prospects if presented with a sizeable 
convoy which is welI trained and equipped. 
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It is crucial that our means and mandates be commensurate wilh the 
magnitude of the challenge we accept_ I do not wish to imply Ihat DPKO 
subscribes to a doctrine of overwhelming force_ But I do insist that our toaIs 
and our tasks be proportionate. We carmot undermine our response and our 
responsiveness as we did in lhe early stages of lhe Rwanda conflic!. 
Perhaps at the heart of lhe problem Iies neilher the issue of command 
and contraI nor the question of the Iimited nature of the rules of engagement. 
Perhaps we should look instead at the question of being bogged down by 
too long a time commitment, ar the lack of what some governments refer to 
as an exit strategy. 
This is a grave problem. Collective security must support lhe world 
community, not drain iI. ln OUr worst nightmares, we have alI seen visions 
of opel'ations with mandates like UNPROFOR, costs Iike UNOSOM, and 
durations Iike UNFICYP. To prevent Ihat nightmare from becoming a 
reality, a number of steps are necessary. 
If our intervention is to be cost-effective, it must be swift and substan-
tia\. If governments are to be persuaded to support this kind of intervention, 
they wil\ need to be assured that the lenglh of Iheir presence, lhe costs to 
their citizens, and the threat to their troops are acceptable to them. Among 
the many possible reforms which we are pursuing at DPKO, Ihere is One 
innovation to peace-keeping which can help to bring Ihis about. 
Traditionally, peace-keeping contingents have been replaced by olher 
contingents of lhe sarne nationality. If, instead, we replaced contingents 
af one nationality, at the end of Iheir tour of duty, with cotingents of 
another nationality, I believe that we could address a number of problems. 
First, the costs and demands of lhe missions wonld be distributed more 
fairlY and evenly among the member states. Second, those states wouId 
be more likely to participate if their engagement were not open-ended. 
Third, «rotatiou» within a nationality has too often meant an extended tour 
of duty, and this has made unreasonable demands upon those who are 
serving on lhe ground. 
Of course, rotation is not a panacea. Sometimes it will not work. And 
it does not, in itself, address lhe larger question of how and when to end 
a missiono But it wil\ help individual governments to measure the extent 
of their commitmenl. It will let them measure the breadth and depth of 
their politicaI support for a peace-keeping operation. 
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Command and control, rules of engagement, laek of rotation: perhaps 
aU of these, none of lhem, some combination, or some other factor is res-
ponsible for the difficulties we are facing at the moment. But, whatever 
the reason for lhe emerging pattern in which action is taken unilaterally 
and reactively instead of coUeetively and pro-aetively, that pattern must be 
broken. Problems, if and where they exist, should be addressed, not avoided. 
And Our chances of correcting them in the long term are better if we work 
together. 
CONCLUSION 
So many unknowns face tiS at the moment, so many problems. Yet, as 
lhe Chinese charaeter would remind lIS, in every problem there lies possibili-
ty. The search for those possibilities is what animates peace-keeping to-day. 
ln the last five years, we have embarked on a great exploration together. 
My hope and conviction is that, if om exploration is whole-hearted, it 
collld lead to great discoveries. 
Portugal is no stranger to exporation and discovery. Your history is 
rich with names like Prince Henry the Navigator and Vasco da Gama. You 
have long been one of the world's most admired maritime powers. Five 
hllndred years ago, you travelled half the planeI. endured great hardship, 
and discovered a whole new world. Today, as a smal! ship called peace-keeping 
heads out into rough waters toward an uncertain destination, we look 
fOl'ward to your guidance, your energy, and your SUppOl't. Together with 
you, wc look forward to exploring the possibilities of the new world 
nClW beforc uso 
Koli A. Annan 
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